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Nineteenth century Christian thought about self and relationality was stamped by 
the reception of Kant’s groundbreaking revision to the Cartesian cogito.  For René 
Descartes (1596-1650), the self is a thinking thing (res cogitans), a simple substance retaining 
its unity and identity over time.  For Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), on the other hand, 
consciousness is not a substance but an ongoing activity having a double constitution, or 
two moments: first, the original activity of consciousness, what Kant would call original 
apperception, and second, the reflected self, the “I think” as object of reflection.  Both are 
essential to the possibility of an awareness of a unified experience.  Such an awareness is 
achieved only insofar as the self is capable of reflecting on its activity of thinking. As such, 
the possibility of self-consciousness, or the capacity to reflect on one’s own acts of thought 
is essential to the constitution of the self.  This new model of the mind became the starting 
point to the thought of central 19th century figures such as Friedrich Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834), J. G. Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Søren 
Kierkegaard (1813-1855). This chapter will explore their reception of Kant’s model of 
self-consciousness, the controversies surrounding its development and exposition, and the 
advantages of this model for theological reflection. The idea of mind as essentially capable 
of reflection provided an account of how the self can stand in an ontologically immediate 
relation to God constitutive of the self, while at the same time allowing that the self’s 
consciousness of itself is distinct from this original moment, so that a limited or false 
consciousness of self is possible.  As such the task of the self is to recognize (that is, to 
realize in and through self-consciousness) who it most truly is, both in relation to God, 
and in relation to self and other. 
1.Kant’s radical critique of the Cartesian cogito 
 Famously, for Descartes, the ‘I think’ served as the fulcrum of an apodictic 
certainty that could withstand the radical doubt engendered by the possibility of an evil 
genie.  He reasoned that even if all my thoughts were mere fantasies that did not truly 
reflect a world distinct from the mind, access to both my activity of thinking and its 
products is immediate, and consequently my judgments regarding them indubitable. The 
self to which I have such immediate access is, according to Descartes, a simple substance 
retaining its unity and identity over time. Among other things, Kant’s first Critique offers a 
radical critique of this picture.  At its ground is Kant’s claim that “The I think must be 
able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented 
in me that could not be thought at all. . . .” (B132). Kant notes that it must be possible for 
me to become self-consciously aware of the I think as accompanying my representations 
in order for me to be aware of them as mine.  From this, a great deal follows.  For the I 
think that must be able to accompany my representations is the I think as object of 
thought. Kant’s arguments in the transcendental deduction depend on his an analysis of 
the nature of self-consciousness, that is, of what it is that is involved when the self makes itself 
its own object.  He argues that the possibility of self-awareness, in which the self becomes 
an object for itself, is a transcendental condition of experience.  As such, Kant’s 
understanding of the mind involves two moments that stand in interrelation to one 
another.  The first is what he calls original apperception.  This is the activity of 
thinking itself.  This activity, however, cannot be an awareness of anything unless it is also 
possible for the mind to be co-conscious of itself in its awareness of something.  Hence the 
second moment in self-consciousness is the self’s awareness of itself, its becoming for itself.  
This understanding of the I think as having two moments became the starting point for 
much of nineteenth century thought about the self, its relation to God, and to others. 
2. A Theological Appropriation of Kant’s Model of the Mind 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, often referred to as the father of modern theology, 
inaugurated a new method in theology. A large measure of his significance lay not only in 
his adaption of Kant’s views on consciousness to suit theological purposes, but also in his 
harnessing of Kant’s model of the mind to counter Kant’s relegation of religion to an 
afterthought of practical reason.  Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy had 
toppled the old metaphysics, radically limiting its scope to the objects of possible 
experience. Gone was the legitimacy of speculative enterprises inquiring into the nature 
of things in themselves, God, the soul, and the world as a whole.  Moreover, the 
fundamental demand of practical reason–autonomy–precluded acceptance of revelation 
and what it enjoined on heteronomous grounds.  Schleiermacher’s brilliant synthesis 
reestablished the foundations of theology on wholly new grounds.  Given the success of 
Kant’s devastating critique of metaphysics, how is knowledge of God possible at all?  
Schleiermacher’s answer was: awareness of God is given in the depths of consciousness.  
We know God through God’s action upon us, both in our awareness of our not being the 
ground of our own existence, and through the presence of the divine love in us through 
the redemptive action of Christ.  Because the relation to God stands at the ground of the 
self, we can and must understand religion through that which do have access to: 
consciousness.  Moreover, here the objection that religion leads to heteronomy is 
overcome, for God is not a being that stands over against the self.  Rather, God is known 
in the depths of consciousness, and the self’s true nature and destiny is revealed precisely 
in its relation to God.   
 Schleiermacher’s analysis of the sensuous self-consciousness in § 4 of The Christian 
Faith is greatly indebted to Kant’s theory of consciousness as it had been developed it in 
the B-edition of the transcendental deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason. The exposition 
in § 4 is not only a reflection and commentary on Kant’s analysis, but also establishes that 
it will allow us a proper grasp of the self’s relation to God. In §§ 24 and 25 of the 
deduction Kant had distinguished between a) the synthetic original unity of 
apperception, namely, the original activity of the I think, and b) the self as it appears to 
itself. Concerning original apperception Kant notes, “. . . in the synthetic original unity 
of apperception, I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in 
myself, but only that I am” (KrV B157). In original apperception I am immediately 
aware of my existence since I have immediate access to my own activity of thinking. As 
Kant notes, however, self-consciousness is only possible insofar I am also aware of the 
“determination of my existence,” which “can only occur in correspondence with the form 
of inner sense” (KrV B158). The immediate awareness that I am must always be 
conjoined with a consciousness of the self as it appears to itself in a determinate state.  
Schleiermacher echoes this view of the mind at §4.1, where he notes “there are two 
elements in every self-consciousness, which we may call a self-positing element and a 
non-self-positing element.”  This is what he calls the “duplication of consciousness, 
which contains two elements.   The first expresses “the being of the subject for itself,” 
and the second expresses “its being with what is other than itself.” (KGA I.13,1: 34-35). 
Now the “self-positing” element, that is the spontaneity of the subject, is precisely 
the activity of a free being in its thinking and acting. It must be distinguished from the 
determinate states of consciousness that we can become aware of when we make 
consciousness our object. Awareness of this “self-positing” element is given in the 
immediate awareness of the “I think,” namely, in the very activity of cognizing. This is 
consciousness of the self in its “unchanging identity.” This self-identical consciousness, 
however, is always accompanied by an awareness of the self’s changing determinations, 
which “do not stem from the self in its unchanging identity alone,” but which arise in 
virtue of a reciprocal relation of influence and counter-influence between self and world. 
The immediate consciousness of spontaneity cannot exist by itself; consciousness is always 
directed to an object other than itself, and in its directedness is determined by it. Were 
this not the case, such a consciousness “would express only spontaneity; not being 
directed to any object, it would be only an outward urge, an undetermined agility without 
form or color” (KGA I.13,1:34).   
Key to Schleiermacher’s new foundation to theology is his analysis of the 
immediate consciousness of our spontaneity, for it is in this moment of consciousness that 
we become aware of ourselves as absolutely dependent on God.  Its significance, however, 
cannot be fully grasped outside of a careful analysis of the “duplication of consciousness” 
involved in self-consciousness, which contains two elements. The immediate 
consciousness is that dimension of consciousness through which we are intentionally 
aware of objects; it is the dimension of our cognitive activity. This dimension of 
conscious self-activity must be strictly distinguished from the objects to which 
consciousness is directed. The self can, of course, make itself its own object, and insofar 
as it is its own object, it has a mediated awareness of itself. However, the activity of the 
self through which the self makes itself its own object is distinct from the self as object of 
cognition. This dimension of the self as active cognizer can only be accessed through an 
immediate awareness of the self’s self-activity, that is, through the feeling or experience 
that the self has of itself as it acts. It is distinct from the self as object of reflection. The 
self that reflects upon itself always transcends the self that is the content of its reflection, 
for it is that through which the reflection is cognized, and cannot be contained in it. 
Moreover, it is important to note that the self can only cognize itself as distinct from and 
standing in relation to the world insofar as it has made itself its own object of reflection.  
Schleiermacher will argue that we find ourselves to be absolutely dependent on God in 
the very moment of our immediate awareness of our self-activity. 
Throughout §4 Schleiermacher argues that the immediate self-consciousness 
cannot exist by itself; self-awareness is possible only when an object distinct from 
consciousness in its self-activity is presented to it. In other words, consciousness can 
only make itself its own object if it stands in relation to something outside of it. This is 
because it is only when consciousness is determined to exist in a certain state through 
the influence of that which is distinct from it that it can reflect upon itself, for such a 
reflection of the self on itself is only possible if in self- consciousness there is a self-
identity in difference, that is, if the self as object can be differentiated from the self as 
cognizer, while at the same time the identity of both is preserved. Such differentiation is 
possible only insofar as the moments of the self as reflected upon are states of awareness 
determined through the mutual influence between the self and what is other than the 
self.  
Two things are important in this regard. First, in the first element of self- 
consciousness, namely, the self-positing element or what corresponds to original 
apperception, the self grasps itself immediately in its activity. Second, in the second 
element of self-consciousness, moments of the self as object of reflection are co-determined 
by both the spontaneity (self-activity) of the subject and the subject’s receptivity insofar 
as it has been affected in a certain way. Since the first element in self-consciousness is 
simply the subject in its sheer activity, it is not dependent on the world, and since the 
second element of self-consciousness is a product of both spontaneity and receptivity, it 
too cannot be understood as fully dependent on the world. At the end of §4.3 
Schleiermacher argues that the feeling of absolute dependence cannot arise from the 
objects to which consciousness is directed (the world as object of consciousness), for on 
those consciousness always directs a determining counter-influence. Consciousness is, as 
such, only partially determined by what lies outside it; it not only contains a self-
positing element, namely the activity of the I think, it also partially determines what is 
given to it through both its spontaneity and its receptive powers. Only in and through 
the consciousness of one’s self activity in relation to the world is a feeling of absolute 
dependence towards God possible. If we are to speak of absolute dependence, then it 
must be the self in its very activity of cognizing the world that is understood as dependent 
on a source that transcends both self and world, and is the source of both. 
Schleiermacher cannot be clearer: absolute dependence is “the consciousness that the 
entirety of our spontaneity, in relation to which we should have had a feeling of 
freedom, springs from elsewhere, even as it must have sprung from ourselves. Without 
the feeling of freedom, however, a feeling of absolute dependence would not be possible” 
(KGA I.13, 1:38).  Given that the world with which Schleiermacher concerns himself is 
the world as it is given to consciousness, the absolute dependence of our conscious activity 
on a source outside ourselves also encompasses the world as object of conscious 
reflection, for the self becomes aware of itself through its world. Both the self and its 
world are absolutely dependent, and as such the “Whence” from which both our 
spontaneity and receptivity springs “is not the world, in the sense of the totality of 
temporal existence, and even less is it any single part of the world” KGA I.13,1: 39). 
Through his appropriation of Kant’s theory of the mind Schleiermacher 
constructed a powerful systematic theology bypassing the outmoded metaphysics, and 
lay the foundations for a fertile existential spirituality developed throughout the 19th 
and 20th centuries grounded in the claim that the place to inquire of the presence of God 
was at the very ground of the soul. 
3. The Double Constitution of Consciousness and Absolute Idealism 
While Schleiermacher remained within the Kantian paradigm in holding that the 
self is receptive to influences from outside it (so that the self stands in a real relation to 
that which is distinct from it), both Fichte and Hegel concluded that consistency in 
thinking through Kant’s model of consciousness forces us to conclude that we must 
eliminate “things in themselves” as grounding affections of the mind.  The Kantian 
model of self-consciousness was the starting point for the philosophy of both, and 
reflection on its implications led both to the shore of absolute idealism.   
J. G. Fichte was one of Kant’s most able followers. He later developed his own 
system of transcendental philosophy, the Wissenschaftslehre. In his little book The 
Vocation of Man published in 1800, Fichte provides an argument purporting to show that 
first, we are conscious only of our own consciousness of things, and second, that we 
cannot validly use the category of causation to infer that there is something outside of 
the mind causing changes in its modifications.  As such, the idea of an unknown and 
unknowable thing in itself grounding these modifications is utterly useless.  Everything, 
then, is mind and the activity of mind, and our consciousness of objects is merely the 
result of the necessary activity of mind in coming to know itself.  This argument is used 
to stave off the specter of materialistic determinism, whose character and dire 
implications he had developed in the first part of the book.  If everything, however, is 
mind and the activity of mind, there is nothing outside the mind that determines it to be 
one way or another.  Consciousness, then, is essentially free. 
The starting point of Fichte’s argument, developed in the second section of the 
book, is his rendition of Kant’s claim in §16 of the first Critique that it must be possible 
for the I think to accompany all my representations.  He notes that “strictly speaking 
you have no consciousness of things, but only a consciousness….of a consciousness of things.”   
The initial discussion concerns the question of problematic idealism:  if all we have is a 
consciousness of our consciousness of things, how do we move from our consciousness 
to that which lies outside it and determines its modifications? The transcendental realist 
will answer:  we make an inference from the modifications of our mind to that which lies 
outside the mind through the principle of causality: we posit things outside the mind 
that affect it and determine changes in its modifications. But how do we know of this 
causal principle? The realist assumes that we arrive at the principle of causality through 
a universal generalization of relations between empirically given things. Fichte notes 
that this argument turns in a circle, for we would then only arrive at the very principle 
needed to establish that there are outer things through the assumption that there are 
outer things and that we can generalize in regard to their interrelations, thereby 
arriving at the principle of causality (43). Rejecting an empirical origin to our 
knowledge of the principle of causality, Fichte follows Kant in arguing that causation is 
a law of the mind through which our representations are synthesized in order for 
objective knowledge to be possible.  Application of the principle of causation must be 
internal to our representations, that is, it relates our representations to one another and 
allows us to posit phenomenal objects.  This principle cannot, however, relate our 
representations to something that is wholly outside of the mind altogether. To have 
knowledge of such a mind-independent representation would be to “jump over myself” 
(59). As such, Kant’s thing in itself, posited as the ground of affection, is to be done away 
with altogether. 
   Fichte arrives at idealism not only through his analysis of causation, but 
especially though his analysis of consciousness itself.  He asks, ‘What does that mean 
when you say “I,”…?  His answer is an in-depth reflection on the implications of Kant’s 
model of consciousness.  Recall that Kant argues that it must be possible for the self to 
become conscious of itself as having a representation if that representation is to be 
integrated into the single objective experience of the subject.  This means that 
consciousness of phenomenal objects requires that I be able to reflect on my 
representations as mine, and this implies self-consciousness. In other words, it must be 
possible that the I can become an intentional object of awareness alongside the objects 
of experience.  But a condition of the self becoming its own object in reflection is the 
original activity of the I think, that is, original apperception.   Since this original moment 
is not yet reflected upon, in it there are no distinctions between subject and object; this 
moment is the ground of both.  One grasps this moment of self consciousness 
“immediately simply by existing.” The identity of subject and object constitutes the 
self’s “essence as intelligence.”  However, one cannot “become conscious of this identity, 
of that which is neither subject nor object but which is the foundation of both and out of 
which these first two come to be.” (48).  This identity cannot be an intentional object of 
awareness since it grounds the possibility of reflection and is the very act through which 
reflection takes place.  This ground must split up in reflection into subject and object if 
consciousness is to be possible at all: 
I am always conscious only on condition that that which is conscious and that 
of which there is consciousness appear distinct from each other.… In finding 
myself I find myself as subject and object, which two however are 
immediately connected. …. This separation…. [is] what you necessarily 
find in yourself as you become conscious of yourself (48). 
The concept of the self as subject only arises in the moment of reflection on the self.  
But reflection on the self as subject requires that the subject reflect upon itself as 
standing in relation to that which is other than itself.  Both subject and object, their 
distinctness and interrelations, are thus necessary for the original activity of thought to 
achieve self awareness and develop its own identity.  Consciousness, then, necessarily 
has two moments.  The first is the original activity of thought (Kant’s original 
apperception).  It grounds the second moment of consciousness, in which the mind 
reflects upon its own activity, thereby becoming for itself in this reflection. However, in 
reflecting it recognizes its identity as subject only in and through its distinction from, 
and interrelations with, the world.  The subject-object split is fully the product of 
original consciousness as it strives to know itself, and all perception is in fact perception 
of the self.   As Fichte notes, “you only perceive yourself:” 
You are placed before yourself and projected out of yourself by the inmost 
ground of your being, your finitude; and everything you see outside of you 
is always you yourself. …. In all consciousness I intuit myself; for I am I…. 
I am a living seeing.  I see (consciousness), and see my seeing (that of which 
I’m conscious) (50). 
When Fichte, famously, noted that “the I posits itself as an I,” what he meant was that 
this positing occurs only through a reflection in which the original activity of thought 
makes its activity its own object and in doing so projects both the self as subject and the 
world as object as the objects of its reflection. 
Because Fichte’s system commits him to subjects that do not stand directly in 
relation to one another, he stands in agreement with Leibniz, for whom the monads had 
no windows.  Free spirits know of each other only in and through their “common 
spiritual source” (109). Original consciousness has its origin in God, and the self relates 
to other finite spirits only in this moment of original consciousness as it stands in 
relation to God.  Hence what is reflected upon–the subject as it stands in relation to the 
world distinct from it–is only the after-effect or mirroring of what has occurred 
logically before, at the ground of consciousness.   
4. Hegel on Absolute and Finite Mind 
 The systematic philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel towers over the long nineteenth 
century.  He was both influenced by, and critical of, Kant’s philosophy.  While Hegel 
significantly revised Fichte’s ideas, his own system is only intelligible in light of 
Fichte’s analysis of mind.  In Hegel, the idea of a duplication of consciousness as 
necessary to the being and identity of mind is taken as the fundamental principle of all 
reality.  Absolute Mind, or God, achieves existence or becomes only through its activity 
of reflecting on itself: “God is self-consciousness; he knows himself in a consciousness 
distinct from him…” (392).   God is a “differentiating of himself within himself” (393). In 
reflecting on itself Absolute Mind goes out of itself and becomes other than its original 
activity, that is, Absolute Mind must become a system of finite minds (subjects) that 
relate to one another in and through nature. Infinite Mind achieves knowledge of itself 
through the perfecting of finite minds, and their perfection is achieved when they come 
to know themselves as expressions of Absolute Mind.  Hence, the consciousness that is 
distinct from God, namely, the consciousness of finite spirits, “is implicitly the 
consciousness of God…. We define God when we say that he distinguishes himself from 
himself and is an object for himself but that in this distinction he is purely identical with 
himself–that he is spirit.” (392). Hegel moves beyond Fichte in that the other in which 
Absolute Mind reflects itself to itself is itself a system of finite minds, and these finite 
minds in turn achieve their identity through the process of self-reflection through which 
they become aware of their true identity.  As such, both Absolute Mind and finite minds 
have their being in their becoming: all mind is spirit precisely because it only achieves 
its being and identity through the never-ending process of self-reflection.  God knows 
himself when finite minds achieve knowledge of their true identity.  God, therefore, 
must go out into his other in order to be; God must create.  As such, Hegel’ system is 
essentially heterodox.  
 In God, according to Hegel, there are three moments. The first is the eternal 
idea of God.  Here we have “God in his eternity before the creation of the world and 
outside the world.”  Strictly speaking, this moment cannot, by itself, achieve being, for 
God becomes only through moving into his other.  However, this moment contains 
implicitly the logic of God’s becoming.  The second is God’s becoming other than God-
self in actuality, God’s movement into God’s other, the arising of nature.  In nature 
finite minds come into being, and in and through nature finite minds work out the 
process of estrangement and reconciliation.  Through this process selves come to a true 
knowledge of themselves.  This knowledge is no mere gnosis, but a practical working out 
of the self’s true identity through action and its relation to others. It culminates in the 
love in which each being achieves true knowledge of itself through its reflection of itself 
in the other. This is the third moment, that of spirit. 
 Because finite mind is that through which the Absolute becomes other than itself 
in order to know itself, finite minds are implicitly divine. This means that the principle, 
or the inner law of the process that culminates in the love of the Holy Spirit, wherein 
the divine in them becomes manifest and known, is already contained within them. 
However, insofar human beings are merely implicitly good, they “are good only in an 
inner way, or according to the concept…” (439).  While the principle of their self 
development is already contained in them, insofar as it remains merely implicit, this 
principle has not yet been worked through and the self is not self-consciously aware of 
who it really is: “what is needful is that it must become for itself what it is in itself, it 
must arrive at its concept” (407).  This working through involves an arduous narrative 
and historical process through which the individual arrives at a true self-understanding 
of itself through its working out of its identity in terms of its relation to God, the world, 
and to others.  A condition of its ability to achieve this is its capacity for self-reflection. 
 That the human being is only implicitly good is the presupposition for the 
intelligibility of Hegel’s claim that “humanity is by nature evil”  (440).  This is because 
in order to be fully realized, human beings must complete the process through which 
what is merely implicit becomes fully explicit; this becoming explicit requires that the 
individual arrive at a correct self-reflection, one that truly expresses the real nature of 
its inner being.  Insofar as the individual merely expresses the power of nature, it values 
and seeks to realize only “the inclinations and desires, instinct and passions; and this 
first fulfillment is the fulfillment of its natural state” (407).  To the degree that she 
remains submerged in the powers of nature, the person is not free, for she does not 
express her real essence.  Instead, she finds herself valuing and acting in accordance 
with the desires of an alien power, namely, those that spring from her particularity as a 
merely natural being. The passions are selfish drives; they are expressions of the 
individual insofar as she is ensconced in nature, that is, insofar as she is a particular 
whose desires are causally determined and therefore lie outside of the will as practical 
reason itself:  “… as a natural subject it [the human being] is this single individual; the 
will involved is this singular will, and it is fulfilled with the content of its singularity” 
(441). This is the Kantian moment in Hegel’s philosophy: for Kant, the inclinations and 
passions belong to the lower faculty of desire.  Action determined by the lower faculty 
of desire alone is evil, for here the individual has neglected to determine whether such 
action might agree with the demands of the universal moral law.  For Hegel, too, action 
stemming from the passions alone is also evil: “When humanity exists only according to 
nature, it is evil” (440). Yet evil is only possible because the demand for the good is 
already present within the human being.  If human beings were only capable of instinct, 
they would be neither good nor evil.  But because the reason within them functions as a 
drive to universal values, there is a cleavage between the individual’s purely natural 
determinations and the demand for goodness. This brings about a contradiction in the 
individual, one that brings about extreme anguish, or the unhappy consciousness. 
 Strikingly, this leads Hegel to conclude that evil originates with consciousness: 
“cognition is the source of evil. For cognition or consciousness means in general a 
judging or dividing, a self-distinguishing within oneself…. The cleavage, however, is 
what is evil: it is the contradiction. It contains two sides: good and evil.” (443). Once the 
individual becomes self-consciously aware of itself in reflection, it grasps itself as a 
subject that stands over against the world. Its drives are natural drives that pit it 
against the rest of nature, and henceforward it recognizes its life as one of struggle. 
More importantly, the individual comes to an understanding of itself through its 
dealings with other self-conscious beings who are necessary to its self-development, but 
who will also check the realization of its desires. Furthermore, insofar as it grasps itself 
as a singular individual and recognizes itself as finite, it also understands itself as 
standing over against the Absolute, namely God.  This recognition of itself as a subject 
in relation to what is other than it is the fundamental presupposition of the 
contradiction that leads to anguish. On the one hand the individual is finite, filled with 
natural drives, and struggles for self-assertion.  On the other hand, there is a strong 
desire to be one with the universal, that is, for reconciliation with all that is other than 
the self and with God.  These are fundamentally conflicting demands stemming from 
both the antithesis between self and world, and self and God.  Anguish before God is an 
infinite anguish, one striking the individual at its very core, for the individual recognizes 
itself as evil, as not at one with God, and as lacking in fundamental value: “It is not that 
one has transgressed this or that commandment, but rather that one is intrinsically 
evil–universally evil, purely and simply evil in one’s innermost being” (447).  This evil 
grounds all particular instances of evil; it lies at the root of the individual’s fundamental 
stance vis à vis God and world, and describes the split or cleavage that, if left 
unchecked, leads to a complete deterioration of the self.  As Hegel notes, “nothing 
remains outside this antithesis. . . .This is the deepest depth” (447). 
 This infinite anguish can only be healed through the work of God himself, who 
appears in the form of the God-man and reveals to consciousness that finitude does not 
lie outside of the divine, but is rather, a necessary moment in the divine life. Hegel 
explains, “…the human, the fragile, the weak, the negative are themselves moments of 
the divine, that they are within God himself” (468). And the death of the God-man 
represents the death of death, that is, the end of limitation and finitude, and therefore of 
anguish and the return of consciousness into the divine life. This return constitutes the 
movement of spirit; it is accomplished, according to Hegel, principally through the 
reflection that consciousness achieves in the ethical domain, that is, spirit knows itself as 
spirit through its relation to other finite minds.  God achieves, or becomes God-self, 
through the expression of the divine love. This is the work of finite consciousness, 
which must become what it truly is, must become for itself, what it is in itself. This self-
becoming has two poles: first, the self’s relation to the Absolute.  This is what the self is 
in-itself: its essence is to be a mirror of the divine, so that the principle of its self-
development is already contained within it, albeit only implicitly.  Second, it becomes for 
itself when this mirroring process (the principle of self-development) becomes explicit 
and achieves its goal.  This is the goal of eternal love in which finite spirits express the 
divine love to one another in the spiritual community:  
When we say ‘God is love,’ we are saying something very great and 
true….  For love is a distinguishing of two, who nevertheless are absolutely 
not distinguished for each other.  The consciousness or feeling of the 
identity of the two–to be outside myself and in the other–this is love. I have 
my self-consciousness not in myself but in the other.…  This other, 
because it likewise exists outside itself, has its self-consciousness only in me, 
and both the other and I are only this consciousness of being-outside-
ourselves and of our identity; we are only this intuition, feeling, and 
knowledge of our unity. 
Love is only possible on the condition that selves are individual subjects, that is, discrete 
individuals.  The process of individuation–the whole history whereby the self becomes 
an individual–is thus an essential one if love is to be possible at all.  Yet this process is 
not one that the individual can achieve alone: the self achieves consciousness of its 
identity when it knows itself in the other, and when the other knows itself in it. I find 
my value in the other’s valuing of me, and vice-versa: we reflect our value to one 
another.  The divine love of the Holy Spirit is expressed when the mutual reflection of 
value is maximal and harmonious.  In this love there are no more questions to be asked 
or answered: in it I just am, and through it my whole existence gains an absolute value. 
Absolute Mind thereby achieves being in and through this process whereby it 
externalizes itself into finite minds, and finite minds come to know their true identity as 
manifestations of the Absolute in and through their relations to one another. 
5. Kierkegaard on Faith and Reflection 
 Central to the work of Søren Kierkegaard, a prolific writer known as “the father 
of existentialism,” is his understanding of the self as a becoming, namely as spirit, which 
achieves its existence in reflecting upon itself. At the beginning of Sickness unto Death he 
notes that “spirit is the self.  But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself 
to itself or is the relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation” (13). Proper analysis of 
this definition reveals that Kierkegaard’s understanding of self-consciousness contains 
many relations.  First, there is the simple relation of the original activity of self-
consciousness (original apperception) to the power that establishes it. This is an 
ontological relation.  The self is simply absolutely or “completely dependent” on God, 
and it is this relation of dependence that establishes its reality. Second, there are two 
relations of reflection through which the self becomes a self by becoming for itself and 
reflecting on its situation and possibilities, and thereby interpreting and understanding 
itself. As Kierkegaard notes, “The self is reflection, and the imagination is reflection, is 
the rendition of the self as the self’s possibility” (31). In both these relations of reflection 
we have a relation within a relation, that is, the self becomes a self through reflecting on 
itself as a subject and how it stands in relation to that which is other than it.  In the first 
case, the self in its original activity reflects on itself (and thereby relates to itself) by 
grasping itself as a subject in relation to the world.  The second case of reflection is yet 
more complicated, for here we have, in a sense, a reflection on a reflection: here the self 
reflects on its reflection regarding its relation to the world, and in this reflection 
thereby relates itself, in one way or another, to the power that establishes it.  
Kierkegaard’s understanding of the self’s becoming a self, and its relation to God and to 
others cannot be understood without this complex model of the nature of self-
consciousness and the role that reflection plays in it.  Reflection is an infinite possibility, 
for the self can always turn around and reflect on its reflection.   
 The ontological dependence of the self on God is not one in which God 
determines the self to be one way or another.  God establishes the reality of the self, but 
lets go of its activity of reflection, so that it is up to the self to determine how it will 
understand itself, and therefore who it will be.  The capacity for free reflection is 
thereby the origin of despair: “Where, then, does the despair come from? From the 
relation in which the synthesis relates itself to itself, inasmuch as God, who constituted 
man as a relation, releases it from his hand, as it were–that is, inasmuch as the relation 
relates itself to itself.  And because the relation is spirit, is the self, upon it rests the 
responsibility for all despair at every moment of its existence….” (16). The capacity for 
reflection, and thereby the possibility of despair, is also that which elevates the human 
being to the level of spirit.  Despair has its origin in the self’s ability to reflect on the 
self’s understanding of itself in relation to the world, and in thus reflecting on its 
reflection, to relate itself to the power that establishes it.  Now the self always stands in 
an ontological state of dependence to the power that establishes it.  And not only is the 
self capable of understanding this ontological dependence, of accepting it, and of resting 
in it, this acceptance is the only way that it can avoid despair: “The formula that 
describes the state of the self when despair is completely rooted out is this: in relating 
itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that 
established it” (14).  All other attitudes that the self can take towards its true character, 
whether of ignorance, indifference, or defiance, are forms of despair, for there is only a 
single formula for the equilibrium of the self, and that is its acceptance of itself as 
absolutely dependent upon the power that established it.  Hence all preoccupations with 
the things of this world, and all expressions of the self outward into the world can 
become occasions for the loss of the self, that is, for the forgetting or ignoring of the 
true self, the self that is what it is in virtue of the power that established it.  They are 
diversions through which the self forgets the fundamental problem of the self, the 
authority problem in relation to God. Yet resting transparently in the power that 
established the self is not something that happens all at once, but is something that 
must be worked through, moment by moment, as the self develops its understanding of 
itself in relation to the world and reflects on it.  And since the reflection through which 
the self achieves itself is something that must be carried on perpetually, both despair 
and faith must be reestablished in every single moment of the self’s being in the world 
and its reflection upon it.  
 Kierkegaard points out two fundamental forms of despair: one is a “weak” form 
of despair based upon self-deception.  Here the self looses itself in the world, ignores 
itself and its fundamental condition, namely its relation to the Absolute.  Whether it is 
happy or unhappy, it attributes its condition to how it is faring in the world.  It is 
always directed outwards, it believes that earthly goods will fill it up.  Here the self 
remains in a kind of naïve immediacy.  This does not protect it from despair, however, 
for the self cannot be fully itself until it knows itself in the power that established it.  
Hence, even in the most happy moments of such immediacy there is an internal 
restlessness, a nagging doubt that cannot be fully quieted. Here the self must work 
continuously to deceive itself, to forget its origin and true self.  In the second kind of 
despair the individual is much more self-conscious.  She is quite aware of her freedom, 
that is, of that moment of original consciousness, where she is quite free to chose how 
she will imagine and reflect upon herself.  This original moment of thought is the 
“infinite form;” infinite because it is the source of all reflection and can infinitely reflect 
on itself: “With the help of this infinite form, the self in despair wants to be master of 
itself or to create itself, to make his self into the self that he wants to be, to determine 
what he will have or not have in his concrete self” (68). Instead of accepting itself as 
resting in the power that established it, here the self denies its dependence and fancies 
that it can make itself into who and what it wants to be.  In reflection, it turns away 
from its dependence, strives to ignore it, and pays attention only to its own activity: 
“Like Prometheus stealing fire from the gods, this is stealing from God the thought–
which is earnestness–that God pays attention to one; instead, the self in despair is 
satisfied with paying attention to itself, which is supposed to bestow infinite interest and 
significance upon his enterprises, but it is precisely this that makes them imaginary 
constructions” (68-69). 
In Kierkegaard we have all the elements of self-consciousness developed earlier:  
in agreement with Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard will argue that the self is absolutely 
dependent on a power that establishes it.  And in agreement with Fichte and Hegel, 
Kierkegaard understands that the self must continually become itself through reflection, 
that is, it becomes itself as it understands and interprets itself. Faith is born in 
reflection, in how the self chooses to understand itself as it carries out its daily self-
development in relation to the world.  In faith, the self is fully present to itself “in the 
small part of the task that can be carried out at once” (32). 
While Kierkegaard worked with an understanding of self-consciousness indebted 
to Kant, Schleiermacher, Fichte, and Hegel, he had significant differences with Hegel, 
and understood himself as working through and revising Schleiermacher’s idea of faith 
as absolute dependence.  His disagreement with Hegel is rooted in the question of the 
relations between God, self and world, and their ontological constitutions.  While Hegel 
adopts a heterodox conception of God (Absolute Mind becomes through expressing 
itself out into the world), Kierkegaard adheres to a more orthodox understanding: God 
exists independently of the world.  For Hegel God must express God-self into the world 
in order to become. As such, the ethical or universal, in which finite minds achieve the 
life of spirit, is the highest expression of human life. Kierkegaard notes that for Hegel 
“The whole of human existence is in that case entirely self-enclosed, as a sphere, and the 
ethical is at once the limit and completion. God becomes an invisible vanishing point, an 
impotent thought, and his power is to be found only in the ethical, which fills all 
existence” (Fear and Trembling, 98).  One cannot relate to God outside the ethical sphere 
in Hegel, for God becomes only insofar as the divine love achieves its expression in the 
world.  For Kierkegaard, on the other hand, the individual that has chosen and 
developed herself by committing herself to genuine relations with others still has not 
made the final, necessary movement whereby she relates herself to God. Kierkegaard 
will agree with Hegel that real commitment to others and participation in the public 
sphere may very well be a necessary moment in the development of self-consciousness.  
The ethical sphere as described by Judge William in Either/Or corresponds to Hegelian 
Sittlichkeit.  Yet because God exists independently of the world, the self must make yet 
another movement whereby it consciously (in reflection) accepts its ontological 
dependence on God. This cannot be done publicly or arrived at through one’s relation to 
others: 
In the ethical view of life, it is the individual’s task to divest himself of the 
determinant of interiority and give it an expression in the exterior…. The 
paradox of faith is this, that there is an interiority that is incommensurable 
with the exterior, an interiority which, it should be stressed is not identical 
with the first [that of the child] but is a new interiority…. Recent 
philosophy has allowed itself without further ado to substitute the 
immediate for faith.  If one does that it is ridiculous to deny that faith has 
existed through all ages.  Faith in such a case keeps ordinary company, it 
belongs with feeling, mood, idiosyncrasy, hysteria and the rest. (97). 
 It is in its inmost depth that the self is dependent on God, and it is only through going 
inward into these depths and resting in them that the self achieves equilibrium.   
Genuine faith requires reflection on, and acceptance of, this dependence, and all the 
self’s doings in the world and relations to others must be referred to this dependence. In 
his discussion of the moment of a ‘second interiority’ Kierkegaard takes issues with both 
Schleiermacher and Hegel.  For Hegel, the moment of evil in consciousness arises when 
the self chooses to remain within its abstract freedom. Here it makes no choices or real 
commitments to others, for these would compromise its possibilities. Instead it relates 
to others by always withholding itself or through sheer self-assertion.  This is the first 
interiority, the interiority of the child, which Kierkegaard depicts in the life of the 
aesthete in Either/Or.  Along with Hegel, Kierkegaard agrees that this first interiority 
must be overcome.  Yet contra Hegel, he affirms that the self cannot rest there.  Once 
the self has developed itself through a passionate commitment to an individual or 
enterprise in the world, it must move inward yet again. It must, in reflection, refer this 
self-understanding–how it stands in relation to the world–to its absolute dependence on 
God.  And here we find Kierkegaard’s critique of Schleiermacher. For Schleiermacher, 
piety is “a modification of feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness” (CF § 3). 
Kierkegaard charges that Schleiermacher substitutes “the immediate for faith,” that is, 
for Schleiermacher, faith remains within the moment of immediacy. Certainly 
Schleiermacher is correct that the self is directly dependent on God.  But this is an 
ontological matter, and everyone stands in this relation of direct dependence.  Faith 
concerns how the self understands and interprets itself given this ontological relation.  
Hence all faith, according to Kierkegaard involves a reflection taking the self back into 
its own depths, where it must be content to rest in the power of God. 
The upshot of these developments paved the way for a much more dynamic 
understanding of the self in twentieth century philosophical disciplines such as 
phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics.  The self is not a static substance; it 
is, instead a process, a process of reflection.  It becomes itself as it engages in the project 
of self-understanding and interpretation.  It can, of course, misunderstand itself in all 
sorts of important ways.  Yet its fundamental project in becoming itself is to understand 
itself aright, that is, paradoxically, to become what it most genuinely is. This paradox 
can only be properly understood once several relations are posited: both the ontological 
relation between original consciousness and the Absolute, which establishes its real 
possibility, and the self’s relation to itself in reflection. This reflection is carried through 
as the self comes to understand itself both in relation to the world and others, and in 
relation to the Absolute.  The richness of this understanding of the self for the 
theological enterprise cannot be overestimated: it leads theology directly into the 
problem of self-understanding and hermeneutics in the development of all its major 
elements.  At one and the same time it avoids mere subjectivism, since the self’s 
possibility is established ontologically, and it does justice to the interpretive work of the 
appropriation of salvation which must take place as the self comes to understand itself in 
the task of daily living. 
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